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INDIA AND PAKISTAN - A Cautionary Tale for Israel and Palestine
by Jeffrey Weiss
With the
There is a dissenting view within
Outside of
On the other hand, nine years of post-Oslo terrorism legitimately
raises the question of whether such a policy can bring peace.
Palestinian autonomy has coincided with a dramatic increase in
terrorism.[6] That the further
step of conferring statehood will reverse the course of recent events
requires a leap of faith that is difficult to reconcile with the
violence of the past nine years. In evaluating the alternatives, it is
important to place
It is often said in political matters that 'past is prologue.'[7]
Critics of the peace process argue that withdrawal from the 1967
territories will not lead to peace.[8] They
point to the Arabs' rejection of partition in 1947, the three wars
fought between Israel and its Arab neighbors before the Jewish state
ever occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to pre-1967
Palestinian terror attacks.[9] Yet this review of history, while
clearly relevant and indeed persuasive, is not broad enough. It is
necessary to place pre-1967 (and indeed post-Oslo) conduct into
broader perspective by considering the success of other two-state
solutions to ethnic conflict, particularly where the demands of a
Muslim aspirant to statehood were involved. The purpose would be to
determine if a solution of this type has worked before. If it has,
perhaps the conduct outlined by
There is an ideal case study, in light of which it is possible to
judge the benefits, if any, that a
Palestinian state can be expected to bring. It is the 1947 partition
of
The background of the Indian partition was
Proponents of partition argued that only an independent Islamic
state could ward off bloodshed between these religious communities.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the man who later
became
Because
In contrast to Jinnah's image of the
peace that would follow Pakistan's creation, Mohandas Ghandi insisted that the creation of an Islamic
State would only divide India into "possibly warring
groups," and would not "bring either happiness or prosperity
to the people concerned."[24] Ghandi
challenged the logic of carving out of
Jawarhalal Nehru,
Those who believed that partition would create peace between the
two religious communities were proven wrong the very day
History's judgment of
Partition not only failed to bring peace to Hindu and Muslim
residents of
The creation of
There is much in this history that is cautionary for
The India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine situations differ in at
least one critical respect, however. This difference, though, only
makes the comparison more compelling.
The fact that partition is not yet fully realized between
A. The Promise of Peace
The similarities between the two partition experiences begin with
the promise of peace. Just as advocates of
While Hindu-Muslim communal violence led directly to the adoption
of a partition solution for the Asian subcontinent, the impetus for
the
Public statements surrounding the execution of the Israel-PLO
agreement expressed this theme. At the signing ceremony on the White
House lawn, then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared:
"[W]e will begin a new reckoning in the relations between
peoples, between parents tired of war, between children who will not
know war."[51] On the Palestinian side, Yasir Arafat was unequivocal in his assurance that
the
B. The Bifurcated
To create two states along religious lines in
At independence,
The truncated
There is ample reason to doubt that the two portions of
The presence of a long and indefensible border is a further
destabilizing factor common to both the Asian and Middle Eastern
examples. The Pakistanis have taken advantage of the border situation
to permit militant groups to launch raids against
C. Political Upheaval
Post-partition conflict has had a damaging effect on the stability
of
Assassinations have been commonplace in
The form of government in the Palestinian territories provides yet
another similarity between the India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine
experiences. Like
D. Militarization
Like the Pakistanis before them, the Palestinians have made the
development of a military capability to continue the conflict with
their neighbor a top priority. While the
Rather, the Palestinian Authority has made strenuous efforts to arm
these fighters with weapons more like those used to terrorize northern
Israeli cities from Lebanon during the 1970's and 1980's, than with
side-arms of a type that traditional police
Shimon Peres' prosperity dividend from the agreement with the
Palestinians has also not been realized.
The supporters of the
E. A Muslim Minority in the
The arguments for the creation of
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear why the partition of
In the independent state of
The Pakistanis have not been satisfied with a conventional armed
force. Undoubtedly spurred by
The consequences of an all-out war between
Had there not been a partition of
Another aspect of independence, when considering the creation of a
majority Muslim state, is the government's ability to dismantle the
barrier between religion and state, so that Jihad can become national
policy. Since independence,
In the Palestinian areas, a similar process is underway. The
Palestinian Authority has incorporated Islamic rhetoric into appeals
to the masses for martyrs in the cause for a Palestinian state with
There is another critical area of similarity that tends to support
the analogy between India/Pakistan and Israel/Palestine. Jinnah had demanded far more territory for the
Muslims than they ultimately received through partition.[123] Following partition, Muslim territorial
frustrations centered on control over the former princely state of
Because partition, whether negotiated or Israeli-imposed, will not
solve all issues, it will prevent rather than bring peace. Such a
policy will give the Palestinians the "freedom" to further
militarize the conflict, to foster unofficial military groups involved
in attacks against
F. External Considerations Favoring Partition
Of course, the creation of a Palestinian state has not only been
the wish of those with animus toward
While
The India/Pakistan experience, however, counsels against allowing
external considerations to promote an unwise partition. In 1940,
Based on the India/Pakistan and post-Oslo histories, we can predict
several things with a high degree of certainty. A Palestinian state
will be a dictatorship and will become increasingly Islamicized. It will be
unstable and prone to revolution as competing strongmen vie for power.
It will be militaristic and will continue to pursue avenues for
increasing its ability to wage war with
The more attractive alternatives to partition are those that have
fewer of the attributes of a two-state solution. A red-line that
cannot be crossed is that of creating a Palestinian state with control
over its borders, whether through negotiation or Israeli-imposed
separation. Such control will only lead to a further build up of Arab
armed forces and will precipitate increasingly intense conflict.
Assuming the Palestinians, like the Pakistanis before them, pursue
unconventional weapons, a Palestinian state will be a threat not only
to
Preserving the status quo and allowing the Palestinians to retain
autonomy within areas they now control while continuing Israeli
supervision over the borders, eliminates some
of the vices of partition but not all of them. Since 1993,
An essential basis of the
The
"We must study history to learn its critical lessons, but we must also know when to ignore history. We cannot allow the past to shape immutable concepts that negate our ability to build new roads. Like the river, we are part of the process of perpetual change: landscapes shift, knowledge widens, and technology expands our horizons. Those of us active in the political arena today differ from our predecessors in the burden we carry, in our hopes and in our expectations. A person who hails historical precedent as a formula for controlling future events is headed for disappointment and failure. Knowing when to depart from the past brings a distinct advantage: the element of surprise. Sometimes, in fact, what comes by surprise generates much less opposition than what was expected."[135]
Yet the contrast between the pre-Oslo vision of peace and prosperity and the post-Oslo reality could not be more striking. Indeed, "disappointment and failure" describe, in a particularly apt manner, that agreement's aftermath.
Had history's lessons been considered thoughtfully before
[1].
[2]. Binyamin Netanyahu, Speech Before the
Likud Central Committee (
In any future agreement, if and when we
get that far, I see self-rule in which the Palestinians will have the
freedom to rule themselves. But to establish a state, with everything
that that concept entails, with all the powers I have enumerated
[control over borders, control over air space, right to make military
alliances with other counties, control over underground water
sources], which would endanger
[3].
[4]. Before September 11, the administration had been on the verge
of announcing a diplomatic initiative that was to include support for
the creation of a Palestinian state. Jane Perlez & Patrick E.
[5]. On March 28, 2002, the Arab League formally approved a plan
calling for recognition of Israel in exchange for a full Israeli
withdrawal from all land occupied in 1967, creation of a Palestinian
state with Jerusalem as its capital, and a 'just solution' for
Palestinian refugees. Mohammed Bazzi, Arabs
at
[6]. This can be seen, in particular, with
suicide bombings, discussed infra Part II D. While there were two
Israeli deaths from such attacks in 1993, the year
[7]. John F. Manley, Presidential Power and White House Lobbying,
93 Pol. Sci. Q.
255, 274 (1978) ("Historians are found of saying the past is
prologue."). See also Stuart Rothenberg, For George W. Bush, the
Past is Prologue, CNN.com, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/stories/01/20/rothenberg.column.archives/oldindex.html
(
[8]. See, e.g., George F. Will, Unhelpful Amnesia,
[9]. Id. ("It has been 37 years since [Arafat's] Fatah launched its first attack on Israel, which then (as when attempts were made to crush Israel in 1948, 1956 and in 1967) was within the 1967 borders that amnesiacs believe are the key to appeasing Arafat.").
[10]. The beginning of
[11]. Patrick French,
[12]. Partition, supra note 11, at xi (T. Walter Wallbank, ed., 1966).
[13]. For a detailed discussion of
[14]. The term communal "refers to groups that are set apart by reason mainly of language, religion, occupation, and historical origin." Partition, supra note 11, at viii. In the Indian context, it typically refers to Hindu-Muslim rivalry. Id.
[15]. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 344.
[16]. The British were adamant that the transfer of power to Indian (or Indian and Pakistani) hands be the subject of agreement. However, because the Muslim League refused to accept anything less than partition as part of an agreed settlement, this decision had the effect of ensuring partition. See, e.g., French, supra note 11, at 238.
[17]. Allen Hayes Merriam, Gandhi vs
Jinnah: The Debate Over the Partition of India 68 (1980). Recounting a
conversation with Jinnah, British official
Lord Ismay wrote: "Mr. Jinnah said with the greatest earnestness that,
once partition had been decided upon . . . all troubles would cease,
and they would live happily ever after." Hodson, supra note 13, at 229. Jinnah's sister and confidante Fatima made a
similar assertion, telling the wife of the Viceroy that "the
problems involved would be quite easy once Muslim demands had been
agreed to."
[18]. As Jinnah once put it: "[B]rother Gandhi has three votes and I have only one vote." Wolpert, supra note 17, at 181.
[19]. William Norman Brown, The
[20]. French, supra note 11, at 224; Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 41. The translation is from Persian. Brown, supra note 19, at 145.
[21]. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 41.
[22]. To establish the border between
[23].
[24]. Merriam, supra note 17, at 107, 122.
[25].
[26]. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 33.
[27]. See, e.g., Hodson, supra note 13, at 71-72.
[28]. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 347.
[29]. For a detailed and moving description of the post-independence violence, see Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 340-400.
[30]. This figure comes from historian Stanley Wolpert, who has provided a relatively recent estimate of the number killed in the post-independence upheaval. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 348. However, the actual number of persons killed has been a matter of some dispute, with estimates ranging from 200,000 to 2,000,000. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 399. British commentators have tended to cite lower numbers, with Hodson asserting the 200,000 figure. Hodson, supra note 13, at 418.
[31]. See Penderel Moon, The Cabinet Mission, Doomed from the Outset, in Partition, supra note 11, at 82. Regarding the Direct Action Day killing of 5,000, which occurred before partition, Moon observed: "Compared with what was to follow this holocaust was nothing extraordinary, but it made a deep impression at the time." Id.
[32]. Brown, supra note 19, at 161. Here as well Hodson offers a lower total, asserting that "some five million" people crossed the new border following independence. Hodson, supra note 13, at 418. According to Wolpert, there were ten million refugees. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 348. There have been higher figures as well. According to Brown, if Indian and Pakistani government claims are added, the total comes to about seventeen million. Brown, supra note 19, at 161.
[33]. S. K. Majumdar, Jinnah
and Gandhi: Their Role in
[34]. Brown, supra note 19, at 2.
[35]. Edward D'Cruz,
[36]. Post-independence wars were fought in 1965 and 1971. In 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, infiltrating thousands of armed insurgents into Indian-controlled Kashmir. These soldiers were supposed to link up with the local population and foment a rebellion. Indian forces retaliated, Pakistan counter-attacked, and the fighting spread to the Punjab. A cease-fire was declared in September of that same year. Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947, 43-45 (2001). The next war was fought in 1971, and led to the secession of East Pakistan and the formation of the independent nation of Bangladesh. Id. at 51-74. In 1999, the two nations engaged in sustained battle in Kashmir, along the line of control that separates Indian and Pakistani forces. Id. at 114-120. Because there were more than one thousand battlefield deaths during this fighting, Ganguly characterizes Kargil as a third post-independence war between these two rivals. Id. at 11; see also Jasjit Singh, Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir, at i (1999).
[37]. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 43-45.
[38]. See infra notes 65-77.
[39]. Its current ruler, General Pervez Musharaff, seized control in 1999. Maya Chadda, Building Democracy in South Asia: India, Nepal, Pakistan 225 (2000). Then the army chief of staff, Musharaff achieved power by placing President Nawaz Sharif and his supporters under house arrest, dissolving parliament, dismissing the provincial chief ministers, suspending the constitution, and declaring a state of emergency. Id.
[40]. See id. at 25-26 (summary of
[41]. Chadda, supra note 39, at 23, 43. Chadda calls
[42]. Louis Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi 476 (Harper & Row, 1983).
[43]. French, supra note 11, at 364.
[44]. Compare population figures, including Muslim percentage of total population, in Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook ' Indonesia (2002), Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook ' India (2002), and Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook ' Pakistan (2002), at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
[45]. The Palestinian Authority asserts that: "The comprehensive
permanent status agreement will mark the end of conflict between
[46]. David Makovsky, Making Peace With The PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord
95 (1996) ("it was the intifada that led
Rabin and Peres to agree that finding a political solution to the conflict was
imperative").
[47].
[48]. As Israeli negotiator Uri Savir later put
it: "The Palestinians needed to know that autonomy could lead to a state,
while we needed to know it would bring security. Once the red lines were
understood, everything could be negotiated."
[49]. According to David Makovsky: “During
the Oslo negotiations, PLO officials assured their Israeli counterparts that,
in return for mutual recognition, Arafat - as the "sole, legitimate
representative" of the Palestinian people - would be able to enforce the
deal, control terrorism, and otherwise ensure Israeli security. On that basis,
Rabin persuaded Israelis that one of the virtues of the
[50]. Makovsky, supra note 46, at 53.
[51].
[52].
[53]. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Remarks On the
Occasion of the Signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles
(Sept. 13, 1993), at www.mfa.gov.il. (last visited
[54]. See sources cited supra notes 4 and 45.
[55]. According to Meir:
There was no such thing as Palestinians. When was there an
independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state? . . . It was
not as though there was a Palestinian people in
quoted in Baruch Kimmerling
& Joel S. Magda, Palestinians: The Making of a
People xvi (1993). According to Hanan Ashrawi,
[56]. For a thorough discussion of the 1971 war, including its background and aftermath, see Ganguly, supra note 36, at 51-74.
[57]. Brown, supra note 19, at ix.
[58].
[59].
[60]. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 61-69.
[61].
[62]. Brown, supra note 19, at 206.
[63]. Kathryn Westcott, Who Are Hamas, BBC News
Online,
[64]. James Bennet & John Kifner, 6 Men Who Could Be Contenders to Lead the Palestinians if Arafat Goes, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2002, at A14 (listing Mahmoud Abbas, the secretary general of the PLO; Marwan Barghouti, general secretary of Fatah in the West Bank; Muhammad Dahlan, former chief of preventitive security forces in Gaza; Ahmed Qurei, an economic adviser; Jibril Rajoub; and Sheik Ahmad Yassin, Hamas's spiritual leader; as potential Arafat successors).
[65]. India Blames Pakistan Militant Group for Parliament Attack, PBS Online News Hour Update, Dec. 14, 2001, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/december01/india_12-14.html. [hereinafter PBS].
[66].
[67]. See PBS, supra note 65. See also, At least 30 Killed in Raid in Kashmir, Wash. Post, May 15, 2002, at A23.
[68]. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel and the occupied
territories (2001) [hereinafter State Report] (stating that "[t]he Islamic
Resistance Movement (Hamas), Hizballah,
Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PLFP), among others, all committed acts of terrorism in Israel"
in 2001). The existence of these militant groups is a violation of the Cairo
Agreement between the PLO and Israel, which expressly prohibits the formation
of armed forces, other than the Palestinian police, in areas under Palestinian
control. See Agreement on the
[69]. Lee Hockstader, Israel Besieges Arafat Offices Again As Tanks Enforce Ramallah Curfew, Wash. Post, June 11, 2002, at A20; Israel Starts West Bank Fence Work, Wash. Post, June 17, 2002, at A1; Daniel Williams, Young Bombers Nurtured by Despair: Among Palestinians, a Growing Attitude of Little to Live For, Wash. Post, March 23, 2002, at A1 ("Other than exceptional cases, most suicide bombings are outfitted and dispatched by organized groups: Hamas, Islamic Jihad or al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades."). Rights Group Condemns Palestinian Attacks: Says Bombings Are "Crimes Against Humanity," Amnesty International Says, Wash. Post, July 12, 2002, at A16 (Amnesty International has called suicide bombings "crimes against humanity," and has further stated that they "may also constitute war crimes."). Yet the suicide attacks were only part of the story. According to the U.S. State Department, in 2001, there were "[n]early 2,000 terror attacks" in the West Bank, Gaza, and pre-1967 Israel. See, State Report, supra note 68. In addition to suicide bombings, these included "drive-by shootings, mortar and grenade attacks, and stabbings . . . in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel proper"). Id. These attacks occurred "on a daily basis." Id.
[70]. See, e.g., Doug Struck & Edward Cody, Deal Set in Bethlehem Siege: 13 Palestinians in Church Will Be Exiled to Italy, 26 Others Sent to Gaza, Wash. Post, May 7, 2002, at A1 (referring to Israel's "major offensive launched March 29 to destroy what the Israeli government called the Palestinian terror infrastructure"). As Prime Minister Sharon stated at the commencement of military actions:
In the past few days we have witnessed horrific terrorist attacks - the attack during the Pesach Seder in Netanya, where 21 people were killed, tonight's events in Elon Moreh, resulting in 4 deaths, and the incident which is currently taking place in Netzarim where so far two people have been killed. . . .
Therefore, the government . . . has made the following decision:
The Government has approved principles for extensive operational activity against Palestinian terrorism.
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon & Defense Minister Binymain Ben-Eliezer, Statements at Press Conference Following Cabinet Meeting (March 29, 2002), available at www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp'M
FAHO1180. Operation Defensive Shield, which had begun on March 29, 2002,
formally ended on April 21, 2002. See Cabinet Communique,
Israeli Cabinet Secratariat (April 21, 2002), available
at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp'MFAH01180. ("Prime Minister Sharon
thanked them [the members of the security establishment] upon the conclusion of
this stage of the operation stating that
[71]. Karen DeYoung, Palestinian Statehood Depends on Arafat's Removal, Bush Says, Wash. Post, June 25, 2002, at A1 ("Israeli forces intensified their incursions in Palestinian territory, occupying a half-dozen West Bank cities").
[72]. Collins & Lapierre, supra note 19, at 414-498.
[73]. Serge Schmemann, Assassination in Israel: The Overview; Rabin is Slain After Peace Rally in Tel Aviv; Israeli Gunman Held; Says He Acted Alone at http://www.lexis-nexis.com., N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1995, at A1.
[74]. Chadda, supra note 39, at 48; Wolpert, supra note 10, at 418, 439-41.
[75]. Wolpert, supra note 10, at 439.
[76]. The use by the Palestinians of female suicide bombers has attracted a great deal of attention in the Western media. See, e.g., David Williams, Young Bombers Nurtured by Despair, Wash. Post, May 23, 2002, at A1 (profiling suicide bomber Dareen Abu Aisheh, a 21 year-old Palestinian woman).
[77]. Etgar Lefkovits, Rehavam Ze'evi Assassinated, PFLP
Claims Responsibility for Jerusalem Hotel Shooting, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 18,
2001, at 1. In an odd coincidence, Ze'evi was more
commonly known in Israel by his childhood nickname - Gandhi. Alexander Zvielli, A Man Who Loved His
Country,
[78]. Lefkovits, supra note 77. See also David Makovsky, Ze'evi Assassination and its Possible Aftermath, Peacewatch, No. 347, October 17, 2001, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ watch/Peachwach/peacewatch2002/382.htm.
[79]. See discussion infra note 4.
[80]. According to Hanan Ashrawi,
who has been called "a leader for the creation of a democratic
[81].
[82]. State Report, supra note 68. See also Gal Luft,
Reforming the Palestinian Security Services, Peacewatch,
[83]. According to the 2001 State Department Report: 'PA security forces
arrested some of those implicated in the violence, but many quickly were
released or not kept under credible conditions of arrest.' State Report, supra
note 68. The report also notes that "[o]ff-duty Palestinian security
[84]. James Bennet, Seized Arms Would Have Vastly
Extended Arafat Arsenal, N.Y. Times,
[85]. Lee Hockstader, Israeli Troops Take Over
West Bank Town,
[86]. Evelyn Gordon, Opinion Red Lines Disappearing Ink,
[87]. On several occasions, Palestinians soaked the bolts, nails, and other hardware packed into suicide bombs in rat poison. Ian Fisher, For Israelis Wounded in Bomb Attacks, Recovery is a Battle, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2002, at A6.
[88]. David Rhode,
[89].
[90].
[91]. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 4.
[92]. In 1995,
[93]. Rhode, supra note 88.
[94].
[95]. See Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook - India, supra note 44 ("More than a third of the population is too poor to be able to afford an adequate diet"); Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook - Bangladesh, supra note 44 (stating that "[d]espite sustained domestic and international efforts to improve economic and demographic prospects, Bangladesh remains one of the world's poorest, most densely populated, and least developed nations."); Central Intelligence Agency, Factbook - Pakistan, supra note 44 ("Pakistan is a poor, heavily populated country, suffering from internal political disputes, lack of foreign investment, and a costly confrontation with neighboring India.").
[96]. See Makovsky, supra note 46.
[97]. For statistics on number of Israelis killed in acts of terrorism since the Declaration of Principles, and specifically since September 2000, see Fatal Terrorist Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (September 1993), at http://www.mfa.gov.il'mfa'go.asp'MFAH0cc40. For number of Israelis killed during the Intifada, see Makovsky, supra note 46.
[98]. Lamia Lauhoud, Israeli Arab Terrorism on the Rise, Jerusalem Post Internet Edition, Aug. 28, 2002 (stating that "[s]ince the beginning of the year, some 27 Israeli Arabs have been charged with helping Palestinian terrorists carry out attacks in Israel; in 2001 there were 25 such cases, and in 2000 there were eight cases"), at http://www.jpost.com.
[99]. Benny Morris,
[100]. Id. Morris discusses the recent attempts to revise the history of the
failed
[101]. See supra notes 5 and 45.
[102]. Though Jinnah himself was not a religious
man, his appeal for a separate Muslim state of
[103]. French, supra note 11, at 224. This appeal came during British-supervised
elections in late 1945 and early 1946, which became, in effect, a referendum on
[104]. Wolpert, supra note 17, at 318; Hodson, supra note 13, at 227-331.
[105]. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 5.
[106]. Molly Moore & Kamran
[107]. Perhaps no less troubling,
[108].
[109]. Ganguly, supra note 36, at 1.
[110]. Alan Sipress & Bradley Graham,
[111]. Sipress & Graham, supra note 110.
[112]. Arnaud de Borchgrave, Al Qaida May Have "Dirty" Nuclear Device, United
Press Int'l,
[113]. Moore & Khan, supra note 106. The broader implications of the
Pakistani nuclear program are also visible in
[114]. Certainly, the British seriously examined
alternatives to partition before agreeing to
[115].
[116]. These laws include the criminalization of
adultery and fornication as well as the consumption of intoxicants.
[117]. Federal Research Division, Library of
[118]. Mohamad Bazzi, America's Ordeal; Taliban More Isolated; One of Movement's Few Backers, Saudi Arabia, Breaks Ties, Newsday, Sept. 26, 2001, at A7.
[119].
[120]. See, e.g., Arafat: "I Hope I Will be a Martyr,"
[121]. Asser, supra note 63 ("It [Hamas] is involved in building schools and hospitals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in helping the community in social and religious ways.").
[122]. According to Eyad Sarraj,
the director of the
[123]. Specifically, Jinnah wanted
[124]. See, e.g., supra note 5.
[125]. John Ward Anderson, Palestinians Explore United Front: 12 Disparate Groups Pursuing Secret Talks on Future of Conflict, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 2002, at A1 ("Hamas . . . has declined to clearly renounce the goal of replacing Israel with a Palestinian state stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.").
[126]. In a speech given after the failure of the Camp David summit, then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak listed the elements that must be included in any Israel-Palestinian agreement:
1. Permanent, recognized borders for the State of Israel.
2. 80% of Israeli settlers within settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty.
3. Security arrangements that will provide adequate safeguards from Israel against external threats, mainly on our eastern fronts.
4. No right of return for Palestinian refugees into Israel proper.
5. A Jerusalem broader than it ever has been in our history, with a solid Jewish majority for generations to come; a capital united under our sovereignty and recognized by the entire world.
Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Excerpts from Remarks to the General Assembly of United Jewish Communities (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp'MFAH0iaa0.
[127]. Caroline Glick, Column One: Palestine and the National Interest, Jerusalem Post, May 21, 2002 ("From Yitzhak Rabin to Yossi Beilin to Haim Ramon, the Left has argued that the real reason to give the Palestinians control over territory west of the Jordan and to grant them statehood is to prevent them from overrunning Israel. It was, for instance, Rabin's repeated contention that holding on to 3.5 million Arabs in the territories would make it impossible for Israel to maintain its identity as a Jewish, democratic state.").
[128]. Indeed, Arnon Soffer, author of a study entitled Israel Demography 2000-2020: Danger and Opportunities, argues that "implementing the Saudi separation plan along the 1967 ceasefire lines is dangerous because it would leave Israel with such a large Palestinian population that its Jewish character would be in danger." Soffer proposes an even more radical solution: "Israel must do more than withdraw from nearly all of the West Bank and Gaza; it must also hand over to the Palestinians some of the majority-Arab parts of pre-1967 Israel." Arnon Soffer, Demographics in the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute, Peacewatch, Mar. 22, 2002, at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org. There is, however, an opposing view. According to commentator Ben Wattenberg, "the demographic situation for the Jews of Israel is not nearly as bleak as it is sometimes portrayed." Ben J. Wattenberg, Parents of Arabia, Wall St. J. May 16, 2002. He points to the total fertility rate of Jewish Israelis, which is the highest of any modern country, and compares that to plunging fertility rates in the Arab world.
[129]. Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States-Israel Relations After the Cold War 110-111 (1995).
[130]. Israel Palestinian Violence is Likely to be a Thorny Issue in His Upcoming Trip to Gain Arab Support for the War on Terrorism, L.A. Times, Mar. 9, 2002, at A4:
Kenneth M. Pollack, deputy director of national security studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations think tank and a former Persian Gulf expert at the
National Security Council, described the message Cheney is likely to hear from
his Arab hosts this way: "Our ability to help you on the war on terrorism
and our willingness to abide any military move against Iraq is going to be
guided by the status of the Israeli-Palestinian situation because popular
opinion would tolerate neither until Palestinians feel more secure." See
also Mideast Conflict Damaging U.S. Ties with Arab
States; Escalation Threatens Efforts to Oust Hussein, Baltimore
[131]. Wolpert, supra note 17, at 187.
[132]. On
[133]. Wolpert, supra note 17, at 187, 196.
[134]. See supra note 16.
[135]. Shimon Peres, The New
[136]. George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, in The Life of Reason 3, 284 (Constable & Co. Ltd., 1954).
Jeffrey Weiss is a practicing attorney with the firm of Weiss, Moy & Harris in Washington, D.C. He holds a L.L.M. (International and Comparative Law) from Georgetown University Law Center. He writes, "I wish to express my gratitude to Leisha Self, for her suggestions and comments."
This articles originally appeared in the Connecticut Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 2003.
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