Think-Israel

THINK-ISRAEL

THE TWO BIG MISTAKES THAT KEEP THE CONFLICT GOING

by Professor Barry Rubin

There are seemingly endless rounds of plans, meetings, speeches, and events concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But underneath it all, nothing changes. Why this is so is a long and complex story yet one that can be understood in terms of two fundamental principles which have been repeatedly disproved.

Nevertheless, they continue to rule the thinking of many people and the positions of most countries, even in Israel.

Proposition Number 1: Israel must keep offering the Palestinians more until they accept the deal. This is the best way - or even the only way - to achieve peace.

Proposition Number 2: If Israel keeps offering more concessions it will win international support and sympathy.

Both of these ideas seem logical. This is often how international relations works and conflicts are resolved. It seems to accord with the way people behave in social life. And this set of ideas was the basis for the Oslo peace process and has basically governed Israeli policy during the last decade.

The problem is that in this specific case that formula does not work. On the contrary, it is a blueprint - or shall I say, roadmap? - for disaster. Several thousand people have died partly because of a well-intended but misconceived acceptance of a strategy arising from this concept.

Such matters have nothing to do with partisanship or faction and have no relationship to one being on the political idologies or identities of left and right. Comprehending the situation is a matter of analysis, experience, and mere observation. We must put aside our preferences and wishful thinking in order to see the reality that is all too apparent.

Now this proposition might be true if the sole Palestinian grievance was the Israeli rule over the West Bank, Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem since 1967 and their sole goal was to gain an independent state in which they can prosper and live in peace. Unfortunately, this is not the case.

Things would probably be different if there were a different Palestinian leadership which spent a few years educating its people toward a more moderate goal and ready to fight extremists. Yet this is not the case. On the contrary, the current leadership presses for the harder-line stance and constantly reinforced it. The Palestinian schools, media, mosques, and the overwhelming majority of political organizations all push toward this end.

I have frequently joked that if Israel were to offer Yasir Arafat all the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and east Jerusalem (plus billions of dollars in compensation money), his response would be, "Ok, now let's talk about the return of all refugees." The affair of the so-called Geneva agreement has proven this jest to be an accurate assessment of the situation.

A central problem is that Arafat is not a nationalist whose appetite would be assuaged by the creation of a state. He cares nothing for the kind of social, educational, economic, and other systems he could put in place as leader of a country. Palestinian living standards and welfare are a matter of indifference for him.

Arafat is basically a combination of an old-fashioned Islamist, who believes that God is on his side and that compromise is sinful, and a romantic revolutionary, who does not want the battle to end and would view its termination as a betrayal of everything he stands for. While there are many moderate elements among Palestinians and (who generally only speak out in private) and moderate aspects in the overall mix of many people are thinking, these do not affect policy.

What has instead happened is a demonstration of the saying that appetite grows with the feeding. The more Israel offers, the more is demanded by Palestinians (and the Arab world and the world in general). This trend has been augmented by the fact that the Palestinian leadership has learned two lessons from experience. As they refuse compromise, Israel (or Israelis who claim to speak for it) offer more concessions while the world sides more with the Palestinians. Continuing the struggle thus might seem irrational but it makes good political sense.

There is also a psychological and ideological gap on the implications of continued concessions. In the West, moderation and generosity are taken as proofs that one truly wants to settle a dispute; in the Middle East they are taken as signs of weakness and of knowing that one's cause is unjust.

Yet even in the West, the strategy of giving more and more concessions has been taken as proof that Israel is at fault and the occupation (along with settlements, the fence, and so on) is the central problem in the conflict.

Instead, of course, the central problem is a Palestinian refusal to settle for anything but everything, either immediately or in stages. The use of terrorism as the main strategy of the Palestinian movement (and of sponsoring Arab states) both reflects and deepens the problem.

I do not write these words lightly or willingly. To say these things is the result not of a predetermined ideology or stereotype but rather of experience along with a careful reading of what is actually said and done by the Palestinian leadership and opinion-makers. These are not people whom Israel will persuade by concessions.

Ironic and controversial as it may be, it is nonetheless true to say that Israelis are more eager to withdraw from the territories and to see an independent Palestinian state established (as long as it has the prospects of being stable and peaceful) than is the Palestinian leadership. This is neither a colonial problem nor the mere result of an oppressive occupation. It is an ideological issue on the Arab side, one of how the conflict is defined and the methods deemed worthy of pursuing it.

By continuing to insist that the problem is that Israel has not offered enough, Israelis do not prove their good will but rather seem to suggest that they are the guilty party. This is also part of the reason for the world's hostility.

If these are unfamiliar concepts for the West, they should be becoming more familiar ones from having to deal with such Middle Eastern phenomena as the Iranian revolution, Saddam Hussein, Usama bin Ladin, and radical Islamism. Previous generations supposedly learned such lessons in dealing with fascism and Communism. Not everyone in the world is a pragmatist eager for conciliation with those who prove their good intentions, willingness to make concessions, and kind natures.

These are hard words to say, but then they are needed to explain why this conflict has gone on endless decades, bred so much hate, and cost so many lives.

Profess Barry Rubin is Director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center (GLORIA) and Editor of the "Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal" (MERIA). Its website address is http://gloria.idc.ac.il. To receive free email subscription to their magazine, write gloria@idc.ac.il.