THE QUESTION THAT ANIMATES THIS ESSAY is one that troubles not only Americans, but the friends of freedom and democracy everywhere. Why, when the rewards of liberty have been so amply demonstrated to the peoples of Europe over the course of the 20th century, have they turned with such vehemence against the nation that rescued, restored, and is now again reinforcing those liberties?

Americans and Europeans may inhabit different continents, but they surely do not inhabit different planets. What is commonly called the West still identifies a coherent conception of what a civilization is, or at least ought to be. And in the defense of that civilization, Europeans are doomed by history and geography to occupy the front line. Just as Imperial and Nazi Germany dominated the mainland of Europe but never directly impinged on America, just as the Soviet Union occupied almost half of Europe but in the Western hemisphere never advanced beyond Cuba, so today the jihad poses a far more immediate threat to Europeans than to Americans. Yet the war on terror is viewed with a jaundiced eye from the opposite shore of the Atlantic: For many Europeans, it is America's war, not Europe's, if it is a war at all.

The most influential analysis of this transatlantic divergence has been that of Robert Kagan. As an American living in Brussels, he has been uniquely well placed to observe the workings of the European Union from within, while retaining the critical perspective of an outsider. His treatise Of Paradise and Power crystallized the rival perspectives into a series of neat contrasts: Kant versus Hobbes, peace versus war, multilateralism versus unilateralism, "soft" versus "hard" power. More recently, Kagan has filled out this aphoristic outline with Dangerous Nation, a closely argued and erudite narrative history of "America's place in the world" from the origins of the republic to the early 20th century.

Kagan's argument in Dangerous Nation neatly dovetails with Of Paradise and Power by demonstrating that American readiness to undertake military intervention for humanitarian purposes was not an aberration, but "reflected Americans' view of themselves as the advance guard of civilization, leading the way against backward and barbaric nations and empires." America's martial idealism is rooted in the republic's founding vision of liberty under the law, was tested almost to destruction in the Civil War, and achieved full expression only in the global conflicts of the 20th century. No other nation has so liberally sacrificed its blood and treasure for the sake of liberty; no other nation could have matched such sublime words with such substantial deeds. Humanity in general, and Europe in particular, owes the United States a debt of honor that is unprecedented in history.

It is a debt, however, that remains outstanding, at least as far as most of continental Europe is concerned. With notable exceptions among the "accession" countries of central and Eastern Europe, the only continental states to offer support to the United States in Iraq were Spain and Italy. In both cases, however, the right-of-center governments that took a pro-American line were punished by their electorates with eviction from office -- notoriously, in the case of Spain, under the impact of the terrorist attack on Madrid. While it is true that the volume of anti-American rhetoric has recently been turned down in France, largely thanks to the Gaullist presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, and even more so in Germany, thanks to the chancellor, Angela Merkel, the record of these two leading nations of the European Union inspires little confidence that a real change of heart is in the offing. For all intents and purposes, Europe has ceased to be a reliable ally of the United States. The continent has instead reverted to a complex patchwork of attitudes and allegiances such as existed before the Cold War, with the emergence of Islam as a major political factor serving to polarize opinion for and -- mainly -- against America.
 

IT IS ILLUMINATING TO COMPARE the reactions of Europeans to previous existential threats with the new threat posed by radical Islam. A fundamental difference between Europe's predicament today and those of the past is the absence of the unifying set of Judeo-Christian beliefs that have hitherto defined the civilization of the West. With St. Augustine of Hippo, Christians believed that the city of God was both stronger and incomparably more precious than the cities of men, and that pagan invasions were merely a means of divine chastisement: "Thus, in this universal catastrophe, the sufferings of Christians have tended to their moral improvement, because they viewed them with the eyes of faith. "

The collapse of the Roman Empire in the West was not the end of civilization. On the contrary, the successive waves of barbarian peoples evoked a new kind of civilization, more robust than the ancient polis. Christendom, though never confined to Europe, was constitutive of Europe. When Europe began to deconstruct its Judeo-Christian inheritance, it tore up its roots. Europe forgot the truth about its own origins: that the salvation of Western civilization was made possible by the powers of endurance of Christianity, which in turn owed everything to the miraculous survival of the Jews. The progressive secularization of Europe, driven by what the Jewish scholar Joseph Weiler has called the ideology of "Christophobia," is exposing the civilization of the West to the very dangers against which the Judeo-Christian ethic of spiritual resilience in the face of temporal disaster had for so long protected it. Nor will the invocation of the Enlightenment as an alternative source of inspiration be sufficient. Like the Renaissance culture from which it emerged, the Enlightenment too was indebted to the Judeo-Christian traditions that had preserved the civilization of the West in its darkest hours. If the experience of the totalitarian pseudo-religions of the last century should have taught Europeans anything, it is that in the absence of the active defense of the Judeo-Christian conception of the moral integrity of the human person, the more utilitarian values of the Enlightenment alone cannot be relied upon to prevent a descent into unspeakable depravity.

In the medieval and early modern eras, Europe was able to resist external threats -- primarily from Islam -- by drawing on a warrior ethos, a conscious effort to cultivate martial virtues, that lasted well into the 20th century. That ethos is well summed up by G.K. Chesterton in his stirring poem Lepanto, which recalls the great clash of civilizations in 1571. The point of the poem is that while the crowned heads of Europe ignore the impending Turkish onslaught, the old spirit of chivalry that had animated the Crusades is not yet dead. "The last knight of Europe takes weapons from the wall." As the battle reaches its climax, Chesterton evokes the plight of the godforsaken Christian slaves who rowed the Turkish galleys: "Breaking of the hatches up and bursting of the holds,/Thronging of the thousands up that labor under sea/ White for bliss and blind for sun and stunned for liberty." The point is that Europe, to survive, must connect the love of liberty with the courage to defend it.

Yet that courage is precisely what seems now to be lacking. The moral code under which Western Europe has operated since 1945 puts safety first, second, and third. Bravery is equated with bellicosity, chivalry with chauvinism, heroism with celebrity. Europe contemplates American feats of arms with barely disguised distaste. The bombing of Baghdad in 2003 was intended to induce shock and awe. It did so -- but among the coalition's European allies no less than its enemies. In Germany the refrain was: "Haven't the Americans and British learned anything since Dresden?" The critics ignored the precision of the attack, which reduced civilian casualties to a minute fraction of those inflicted in comparable raids during the Second World War or even Vietnam. The objection was less to the destructiveness of the military technology than to the "gung-ho" enthusiasm of the men and women who fought what proved to be a tenacious and incredibly bloodthirsty foe. The mentality of the warrior, still considered worthy of respect in popular American culture, is regarded in Europe as undisguised fascism.
 

AND YET ALL AROUND US the generations that defeated the Kaiser and Hitler are quietly slipping away, their astonishing deeds disregarded, their decorations treated as mere curiosities. The heroes themselves refer to their exploits rarely, and when they do speak of them it is in a matter-of-fact way that belies the unimaginable circumstances in which they saved civilization from tearing itself apart. Day by day their obituaries record the lives of the survivors, a lost world of famous victories now fallen silent.

One of those who fought on the wrong side in both world wars was Ernst Junger, who wrote a classic account of trench warfare -- he was wounded 14 times -- Storm of Steel. Describing the last great German offensive in March 1918, he describes the mood on the eve of battle: "I sensed the weight of the hour, and I think everyone felt the individual in them dissolve, and fear depart." The dissolution of the individual in war is a fact that frightens Europeans today. For the soldier, however, it is precisely that selflessness that banishes fear. Nor does the collectivism of conflict necessarily mean that mercy is denied to individual enemies. He recalls an encounter with a wounded British officer in the same battle. Holding a pistol to his victim's head, Junger fully intended to shoot him. But: "With a plaintive sound, he reached into his pocket, not to pull out a weapon, but a photograph which he held up to me. I saw him on it, surrounded by numerous family, all standing on a terrace. It was a plea from another world. Later, I thought it was blind chance that I let him go and plunged onward. That one man of all often appeared in my dreams. I hope that meant he got to see his homeland again." It was not blind chance that made him spare his enemy, but the instinctive humanity that made Junger untypical of the Nazi-led Wehrmacht he would nonetheless serve under two decades later. It is this magnanimity that still separates the West from the Islamic terrorists.
 

WHAT IS IT THAT has rendered Europeans so unwilling to rouse themselves in the defense of liberty that Americans so naturally regard as their vocation from God? Consider two examples of martial virtue that are almost commonplace in the United States. A former instructor at West Point, Col. Blair Tiger, told me about the case of a female officer who had lost a leg in Iraq. Though invalided out of the Army, she missed active service, and after an interval she returned to West Point, eager to prove her fitness for duty. Colonel Tiger watched this woman attempt the extremely arduous assault course designed for able-bodied recruits. When she encountered a wall and was required to jump up to a high ledge, he fully expected her to give up. Not a bit of it: Nonchalantly unstrapping her artificial leg, she threw it up onto the ledge, and then with a supreme effort succeeded in hopping up. She climbed down on the other side, put her peg-leg back on, and carried on. Another example: When steel from the wreckage of the World Trade Center was melted down and used to construct the anti-terrorist assault ship USS New York, everyone involved -- from steel workers at the foundry to the naval officers manning the warship -- sensed the "spiritual" significance of this unique act of recycling.

It is not easy to imagine such scenes taking place in continental Europe. Most Europeans are no longer ready to lay down their lives for their fellow countrymen -- or indeed for any other cause. True, we have been here before. In 1933, the year that the Nazis came to power, the Oxford Union, a debating society for the future British political elite, passed a notorious motion: "That this House would under no circumstances fight for its King and country." Hitler apparently took this as evidence that the British would never fight another war with Germany. Once the policy of appeasement was seen to have failed, however, the British did fight -- unlike most of continental Europe. So, though we are undoubtedly living in a period of pacifism or even defeatism, the mood could change abruptly. This time, however, it is not true that -- as a famous Victorian song had it -- "We don't want to fight, but, by jingo if we do,/ We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too." Europe has neither ships, nor men, nor money -- or at least it is not prepared to spend money on war, least of all against Islamist terror.

Why not? The rot set in during the Cold War, which was the first time in history that Europe had not picked up the tab for its own military expenditure. For more than half a century, the United States has subsidized the "European pillar" of NATO. Indeed, NATO eventually came to be seen by cynical Europeans as a thinly disguised mechanism for extracting something for nothing from Uncle Sam. But now that the habits and virtues of martial fortitude that sustain peoples through long periods of conflict have decayed in Europe, it is apparent that the Americans had the better of the deal in the long run.

For those European states that possessed colonies, the Cold War coincided with decolonization. There can be no doubt that this process of imperial disenchantment lies at the heart of Europe's self-absorption. The loss was moral as much as territorial. Europe disencumbered itself of a burden, but the continent also lost much of its own raison d'être. The loss of empire mattered less in itself than as an abandonment of the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania to what often proved a hellish fate. Whereas the United States took on more responsibility for regions with which it had no historical connection, such as Southeast Asia, Europe abandoned its new creations with indecent haste. Most of the 50 million or more people who have died in wars since 1945 were the victims of Europe's abdication of its responsibility towards its former colonies. The damage inflicted on the European psyche by this loss of nerve, this failure of moral imagination, is incalculable.
 

IT WAS DURING THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, the first humanitarian intervention by the newly self-confident United States, that Rudyard Kipling addressed one of his most politically incorrect poems to the American people. Today "The White Man's Burden" offends because of its racial overtones, but it is not really about race so much as responsibility. To the refrain "Take up the White Man's burden," the poet warns of the trials that lie ahead for Britain's American cousins: "The savage wars of peace/Fill full the mouth of Famine/And bid the sickness cease;/And when your goal is nearest/The end for others sought,/Watch Sloth and heathen Folly/Bring all your hopes to nought." Kipling evokes "The cry of hosts ye humour/(Ah, slowly!) toward the light:/''Why brought ye us from bondage,/Our loved Egyptian night?'" Even more prophetic is another passage: "In patience to abide,/To veil the threat of terror/And check the show of pride... " Kipling was well aware, too, that taking responsibility for another people invites the harshest of criticism at home: "Comes now, to search your manhood/Through all the thankless years,/Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,/The judgment of your peers!" President Bush could echo Kipling in the inner recesses of his heart -- any less privately and he would never be forgiven -- but of his European peers only Tony Blair would understand. The rest know little and care less about bringing freedom and democracy to benighted nations. What was once the European burden has become primarily an American one. And though Mr. Bush may wish that he had heeded Kipling's warning -- "Nor call too loud on Freedom/To cloak your weariness" -- his fault, if fault it be, is to have shown too great a zeal for liberty.

The European refusal, not only to assist in the overthrow of a tyrant but to give a fledgling democracy all possible assistance, is a measure of its decline. I once had an exchange with the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer at an embassy lunch about his country's failure to help Iraq to get back on its feet. Fischer protested too much, and his evident irritation betrayed the bad conscience of a postwar German who knew full well that his own people had not so long ago been rescued from a similarly desperate plight by the Yanks and the Brits.

The flight from faith and the ability to endure suffering; the revulsion from war and the virtues of the warrior; the abdication of responsibility that was once the concomitant of imperialism: These are all crucial factors in the transformation of the Old World's relationship with the New. Europe, the homeland of Western civilization, has mutated from a self-confident concert of powers, comfortable in the company of their bold and bumptious American ally, into a continent of querulous, carping prima donnas, quick to criticize anything and everything about the United States but unwilling to make sacrifices for anything beyond their own narrow horizons.

It is easy to forget how recent this transformation is. The revolutions of 1989 promised to bring "Eastern Europe" -- a misnomer for lands that had once been wholly Western -- back to life. The 1990s began with high hopes: the incubus of Communism banished, broken nations and lives healed, with both halves of the continent stimulated by the challenges ahead. Today, less than 20 years after this European epiphany, those hopes have turned to dust. The expansion of NATO and the EU cannot disguise the fact that these Cold War institutions have been hollowed out, and no longer embody any meaningful ideas. To adapt Dean Acheson's famous aphorism about Great Britain: The European Union has acquired an empire and lost its role.
 

WHAT IS GNAWING at the heart of Europe, rather, are two impending crises: demographic decline and the creeping Islamicization of the continent. These crises are inextricably intertwined. Whether or not he was the first to make the connection between demography and Islam, Mark Steyn has led the charge. America Alone makes the case that Europe faces a future of accelerating depopulation -- unless mass immigration by rapidly reproducing Muslims fills the vacuum. His argument is that "Eutopia" -- the pacific, welfare-cosseted, multicultural, green and pleasant land that the EU aspires to be -- is on a collision course with "Eurabia" -- the new generation of hostile, proselytizing, violent Muslim youths bent on turning their adoptive continent into a kind of Gaza strip writ large. For Steyn, a new Dark Ages beckons.

Yet the old adage "demography is destiny" is at best a half-truth. It was the pioneer of demography, the Reverend Thomas Malthus, who gained economics its reputation as the "dismal science" -- and his prediction that industrialization would produce famine turned out to be wrong. By implication, Steyn acknowledges that the transformation of Europe into Eurabia is not inevitable -- otherwise, why bother to polemicize against it? That America really is alone in possessing both the strength and the will to halt the march of Islamofascism, on the other hand, seems to me indisputable. So the question then becomes: How can Europe be mobilized to defend itself? Why, if the diagnosis is so obvious, is the remedy still so unpalatable?
 

ONE WAY OF LOOKING AT THIS is to identify those who are hindering the recognition of reality and then to tackle them. By far the most powerful obstacle remains the left, which still holds power in most European countries most of the time, and which usually sabotages any conservative leader who tries to break the consensus. Just as the left -- with many honorable exceptions -- advocated appeasement of Communism, so today they are busily accommodating themselves to the Islamists. In some cases, such as George Galloway's grotesque Respect Party in Britain, the alliance is overt. More often, though, it is more of a hard cop, soft cop routine. Aggressive secularization, expunging Christian morality from the law and excluding Christian voices from the public square, goes hand-in-hand with an informal acceptance of Sharia (Islamic law). The demonization of Israel represents a similar acceptance of Muslim anti-Semitism. A central tenet of the 21st-century left, too, is anti-Americanism. When in January, Tony Blair welcomed Condoleezza Rice to Downing Street, Peter Hain, a senior member of his cabinet, chose that day to denounce "the most right-wing American administration, if not ever, then in living memory" and declared that "the neo-con mission has failed." These and similar sentiments have become an article of faith for most of the European left, and even for conservatives who wish to curry favor with the liberal media.

Yet the left is not monolithic, and there are dissenters. In Britain, Tony Blair is loathed by the left and now finds himself closer to neoconservatives on both sides of the Atlantic; yet the Euston Manifesto in 2006 brought together a group of left-wing intellectuals who support his stand against the jihad. They are joined by a growing number of writers and academics for whom the censorship, misogyny, and illiberalism associated with Islam are the main issues. Their voices are few but their cry of j'accuse hits home precisely because they cannot be dismissed as "right-wing." The betrayal of intellectual freedom by the European intelligentsia is nothing new. This time, however, the trahison des clercs, as Julien Benda called it, is even more blatantly against the interests of the intellectuals as a class than it was in the case of fascism or Communism. Islam, even in its more moderate form, has no place for the libertarian and libertine values that predominate in what they see as the decadent culture of the West. It is too late to do anything about the likes of Gunter Grass and Gore Vidal, Noam Chomsky, and Eric Hobsbawm. But younger intellectuals who do not wish to be re-educated in Mecca should be able to make common cause with conservatives on the issue of freedom of speech and the press.

The second major stumbling block for those who are serious about stopping Europe's slide into oriental despotism is the new Muslim establishment. Once marginal, Islam is now the fastest growing religion across Europe. Muslims now outnumber practicing Christians in many European cities, and mosques, schools, and other Islamic institutions have acquired power and influence to match. In many cases, however, they have simultaneously been radicalized. Funded largely by Saudi and other Middle Eastern oil money, Wahhabi influence is growing fast. The vast majority of British Muslims are not Middle Eastern in origin; most belong to the Sufi tradition, which is relatively tolerant. But many --probably most -- British mosques are now under the control of community "leaders" who are radically opposed to the war on terror and whose loyalty to the Muslim "ummah" takes precedence over their allegiance to the Crown. It is hard to measure the precise extent of Wahhabi and other extremist influence, but a fairly reliable indicator is the attitude toward women: If they are excluded from the mosque, or segregated in a separate prayer room, it is likely to be hard-line. More than half of British mosques do in fact exclude women, and it is a similar story across Europe.

We can see the results of this radicalization wherever we look. To take a couple of examples: A terrorist suspect who had been subject to a "control order," restricting his movements and requiring him to report to the police every day, absconded and took sanctuary in his local mosque. The British authorities did not dare to arrest him in the mosque, so began protracted negotiations. While these were going on, the terror suspect was given a new passport and smuggled out of the country, probably to an al Qaeda training camp in Pakistan. Another case: An undercover reporter for the Channel Four documentary "Dispatches" filmed a radical preacher denouncing Western democracy before the council of a large mosque in Birmingham. Their only comment was: "When can you start? " The same program uncovered similar evidence of Wahhabi influence on the oldest and most prestigious mosque in Britain: the London Central Mosque in Regent's Park. Of course, it is not a one-way street: Finsbury Park Mosque, where the Islamofascist preacher Abu Hamza radicalized many young men who later became terrorists, is now under the control of moderates. One of them -- a Somali refugee who had seen first hand the terrible consequences of Islamist sectarianism in his native country -- told me exactly how the extremists had been systematically excluded. But these are rare exceptions.

What is to be done? Short of closing down at least half the mosques and subjecting the rest to close scrutiny, there is no simple solution. Moreover, such doctrinal invigilation would run contrary to the great tradition of religious toleration that goes back to Locke and Spinoza. Like Elizabeth I, we do not wish to make windows into men's souls; and like the American Founding Fathers, we do not wish to impose religious tests for public office. Yet radical Islam is as much a political ideology as it is a religion, and Americans have never hesitated to ban members of subversive political parties, whether Nazi or Communist, from entering the country. Perhaps the best rule of thumb is to follow the money, which is the root of all evil, including Islamofascism. The criterion for toleration should be that identified by Pope Benedict XVI: that of reciprocity. No Islamic country that refuses to permit Christian, Jewish, or other non-Muslim worship should be allowed to flood the West with money to fund mosques that promote Wahhabi or other extremist forms of Islam. For example, the British obviously should not let Tablighi Jamaat, a missionary organization that intelligence experts suspect is a front for terrorism, to build the largest mosque in Europe in the East End of London, next to the site of the 2012 Olympic village. Saudi Arabia is not footing the bill purely for altruistic reasons, any more than the rest of the hundreds of billions of dollars that it has dispensed to promote Wahhabi Islam worldwide.
 

CONTROLLING THE CASH SUPPLY may not be sufficient, however. In the view of many, what is needed is an Islamic reformation. Quite apart from the fact that the Christian Reformation was followed by a century of wars of religion, the possibility of Islam actually undergoing such a reformation seems remote. As Pope Benedict has observed, the Koran cannot be reinterpreted because it is supposed to be not merely inspired by Allah, but his uncreated word, dictated to his prophet. As the Pope correctly argued in his Regensburg address, Allah, unlike the Judeo-Christian God, is not logocentric; to be a Muslim means to submit to the will of Allah, not presuming to understand the reason why. Sharia is divine and hence immutable; theocracy is preferred to democracy. The central role of jihad in Islam is not about to change, either. It is this doctrinal rigidity that causes many European Muslims to believe that America is attacking Islam, even though the truth is just the reverse. A religion that emerged in seventh-century Arabia must evolve and adapt if it is to be compatible with the Anglo-Saxon idea of liberty under man-made law on which the United States is based.

The best hope for Islam is not reformation but integration. While the theology of Islam is unlikely to be reformed any time soon, there is no reason why Muslims should not adapt to Europe, just as they have been adapting to various other cultures for 14 centuries. This was the dream offered by the founder of London's Muslim College, Zaki Badawi, whose proudest boast was that he was a member of the Athenaeum, a club traditionally frequented by Anglican bishops. But when Badawi died last year aged 84, his dream of a fully integrated British Islam was still unfulfilled. Instead, a very different dream inspires many young European Muslims: the dream of an Islamic republic under a restored caliphate. Combined with an aggrieved sense of victimhood and a perverted cult of martyrdom, this vision of a purer, universal faith becomes an unstable, volatile, and literally explosive fantasy. The young male fantasists who become Islamist jihadis attempt to live this dream. It has become Europe's nightmare.

In some places, that nightmare is already reality. Europe is now in the early stages of a Kulturkampf, a cultural confrontation between unreformed Islam and the modern nation-state. Europe has internalized the clash of civilizations.

There is potential here for a civil war that could tear Europe apart. Memories of Yugoslavia and Chechnya are still fresh. Yet the American example could still teach Europe how to assimilate its Muslims without conflict. Europe's multicultural model must be replaced by the melting pot, which inculcates American values while respecting religious differences.
 

THAT, OF COURSE, IS NOT ALL that Europe has to learn from America. Where the United States is democratic, the European Union is bureaucratic; where American capitalism is dynamic, European capitalism is static; where Americans are hopeful, convinced that they can solve all the problems of the world by their own efforts, Europeans are fatalistic, helplessly and hopelessly expecting the worst. Europe doesn't have to be that way. (Russia is another story.)

If it is to preserve its place as the heartland of Western civilization, Europe has no choice but to follow America's lead. America's hopes and fears are -- or should be -- Europe's, too. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, this fact of life was eventually acknowledged, grudgingly and belatedly; not so in the case of Iraq. Europe is about to be tested again. When Iran supplies terrorists in Iraq to kill American or British troops, or when it menaces Israel with the threat of nuclear annihilation, Europe's reflexive response is to send diplomatic missions to discover what the Iranians "really" want. What, though, if the Iranian tyrant simply means what he says -- defeat for the United States and destruction for Israel? Is Europe to stand idly by while Ahmadinejad carries on where Hitler left off? The most ignominious chapter in Europe's long history has been deliberately and indelibly imprinted on the collective memory of its peoples -- but for what purpose, if not to prevent a repetition of the Nazi genocide? Iran, then, will be the supreme test of European resolve. If the pusillanimous politicians who strut the corridors of the chancelleries of Europe cannot bring themselves to act before it is too late -- if, in short, they do not support President Bush when the moment comes to halt the Iranian Islamo-Nazis in their tracks, then Europeans will have proved themselves unworthy of their ancestors at Thermopylae and Marathon.

Five centuries ago, Martin Luther wrote in his treatise Secular Authority: "Frogs need storks." The Islamist storks are heading Europe's way -- in fact, they have arrived. The question for Europeans is: Are they men or frogs? If they choose to heed Jacques Chirac rather than Tony Blair, then Europeans will get what they deserve.

 
Daniel Johnson is a London-based contributor to Commentary, the New Criterion, the New York Sun, and other publications. This essay is the sixth in a ten-part series being published in successive issues of The American Spectator under the general title, "The Pursuit of Liberty: Can the Ideals That Made America Great Provide a Model for the World?"

This article appeared in the March 2007 issue of The American Spectator
(www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=11624).

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